This document is being revised to reflect the current facility inventory and accident analyses identified in the WESF BIO. WESF-00-089 was performed for this change. Table 2 .1 Table 3 .1 Table 5 .1 Table 5 .2 Table 6 .1 Table 6 .2 Table 6 .3 Table 6 .4 Table 6 .5 Table 6 .6 Table 6 .7 Table 6 .8 Table 6 .9 Table 6 .10 Table 6 .1 1 Table 6 .12 Table 6 .13 Table 6 .14 Table 6 .15 Table 6 .16 Table 6 .17 Table 6 .18 Table 6 .19 Table 6 .20 Table 6 .21 Table 6 .22 Table 6 .23 (Figure 2 .1). The Hanford Site occupies an area of ahout 1450 km2 (-560 mi2) north of the confluence of the Snake and Yakima Rivers with the Columbia River. The Hanford Site is ahout 50 km (30 mi) north to south and 40 km (24 mi) east to west. This land, with restricted public access, provides a buffer for the smaller areas currently used for research, waste storage, and waste disposal; only about 6% of the land area has been disturbed and is actively used. The Columbia River flows through the northern part of the Hanford Site, and turning south, it forms part of the Site's eastern boundary. The Yakima River runs along part of the southern boundary and joins the Columbia River south of the city of Richland, which bounds the Hanfurd Site on the southeast. Rattlesnake Mountain, the Yakima Ridge, and the Umtanum Ridge form the southwestern and western boundary. The Saddle Mountains form the northern boundary of the Hanford Site.
Major metropolitan areas within the broad vicinity of Hanford include Spokane, Washington, about 193 km (120 air miles) to the northeast; Seattle, Washington, about 209 km (130 air miles) to the northwest; and Portland, Oregon, about 241 km (1 50 air miles) to the southwest. Two other areas of significant population density in Washington State include Moses Lake, about 48 km (30 miles) north of the 100 K Area and the Yakima Valley, extending from Yakima, about 72 km (45 miles) west of Hanford, to the Tri-Cities which includes the cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick. The nearest of the Tri-Cities, Richland, is immediately south of the Site.
2.1.2

Meteorology
Continuous observation and recording of meteorological data has been carried out at the Hanford Meteorological Station (HMS), located near the 200 West Area, since 1945. Climatological conditions on the 200 Area plateau are significantly different from those on the south end of the Site, especially during the winter months when the incidence of low clouds and fog is much greater at the HMS.
The predominant wind direction at the HMS and over much ofthe Hanford Site including the 200 Areas is northwesterly. Monthly average wind speeds are lowest during the winter months, averaging 10 to 1 I km/h (6.2 to 6.8 mph), and highest during the summer, averaging 14 to 16 km/h (8.7 to 9.9 mph). 
Flooding
Large Columbia River floods have occurred in the past (DOE 1987) , but the likelihood of recurrence of large-scale flooding has been reduced by the construction of several flood control and water storage dams upstream of the Site.
There are no Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) flood plain maps for the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. FEMA only maps developing areas, and the Hanford Reach is specifically excluded.
Evaluation of flood potential is conducted in part through the concept of the probable maximum flood (PMF), which is determined from the upper limit of precipitation falling on a drainage area and other hydrologic factors, such as antecedent moisture conditions, snow melt, and tributary conditions, that could result in maximum runoff. The probable maximum flood for the Columbia River below Priest Rapids Dam has been calculated to be 40,000 cms (1.4 million cfs) and is greater than the 500-year flood. The PMF is not expected to inundate the buildings in 200 and 300 Areas but will flood the 100 F, 100 H, and part of the 100 B/C Areas. The PMF may also flood access roads and temporarily cut off electrical power to the 100 and 300 Areas (see Figure 4 .2-10 in Cushing. 1992 ).
Potential dam failures on the Columbia River have been evaluated. Upstream failures could arise from a number of causes, with the magnitude of the resulting flood depending on the degree of breaching at the dam. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers evaluated a number of scenarios on the effects of failures of Grand Coulee Dam, assuming flow conditions of the order of 11,000 cms (400,000 cfs). For purposes of emergency planning, they hypothesized that 25% and 50% breaches, the "instantaneous" disappearance of 25% or 50% of the center section of the dam, would result from the detonation of nuclear explosives in sabotage or war. The discharge or flood wave resulting from such an instantaneous 50% breach at the outfall of the Grand Coulee Dam was determined to be 600,000 cms (21 million cfs). In addition to the areas inundated by the probable maximum flood (see figure 4.2-10 in Cushing, 1992) , the remainder of the 100 Areas, the 300 Area, and nearly all of Richland, would be flooded (DOE 1986; see also ERDA 1976) . Flooding of this magnitude would be a regional emergency along the entire downstream length of the Columbia River. Planning and assessment for flooding of this magnitude is beyond the scope of this document.
There have been fewer than 20 major floods on the Yakima River since 1862 (DOE 1986) . The most severe occurred in November 1906 , December 1933 , May 1948 and February 1996 . The recurrence intervals for the 1933 and 1948 floods are estimated at 170 and 33 years, respectively. The development of irrigation reservoirs within the Yakima River Basin has considerably reduced the flood potential of the river. The 200 Areas are not within lands susceptible to a 100-year flood on the Yakima River.
Wind and Tornado
The Site is subject to frequent strong westerly winds. The all-time peak wind recorded at the HMS tower in the 200 West Area at the 15 m (49 ft) level was a gust of 36.2 m/sec (81 mph) recorded January 11, 1972. The 35.8 m/sec (80 mph) gust is expected to occur once every 30 years. A peak of 38 m/sec (85 mph) would be expected to occur once every 100 years (Cushing, 1992) .
The Site is well outside of established tornado alleys. The probability of a tornado in any year at any point within the 161 km (100 mi) radius ofthe HMS is 6.8 E-6/yr (Stone 1972) .
Seismology
The Hanford Reservation is in a region of low to moderate seismicity. The historic record of earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest dates from about 1840. The early part of this record is based on newspaper reports of structural damage and human perception of the shaking, as classified by the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale, and is probably incomplete because the region was sparsely populated. Seismograph networks did not start providing earthquake locations and magnitudes of earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest until about 1960.
Large earthquakes (magnitude greater than Richter 7) in the Pacific Northwest have occurred in the vicinity of Puget Sound, Washington, and near the Rocky Mountains in eastern Idaho and western Montana. A large earthquake of uncertain location occurred in north-central Washington in 1872. This event had an estimated maximum MMI ranging from VI1 to IX and an estimated Richter magnitude of approximately 7. The distribution of intensities suggests a location within a broad region between lake Chelan, Washington, and the British Columbia border. Seismicity of the Columbia Plateau, as determined by the rate of earthquakes and the historical magnitude of these events, is low when compared to other regions of the Pacific northwest. In the central portion of the Columbia Plateau, the largest earthquakes near the Hanford Site are two earthquakes that occurred in 1918 and 1973. These two events had magnitudes of 4.4 and intensity V and were located north of the Hanford Site. For more information concerning the seismology and geology of this area, see Section 4.2.3 of the Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Characterization (Cushing, 1992) .
Ashfall
The Hanford Site is in a region subject to ashfall from volcanic eruptions. The current WESF mission is to receive and store the cesium and strontium capsules that were manufactured at the facility in a safe manner and in compliance with all applicable rules and regulations. In support of this mission the following activities are conducted; facility maintenance; receipt, inspection, and decontamination (as necessary) of capsules; and storage and surveillance of capsules. WESF will continue to store the capsules until a final disposition is determined.
Building Descriptions
The Figure  2 .3 shows the WESF support buildings and systems. WESF is briefly described in the following sections.
225-B WESF Facility
The 225 Four primary systems provide confinement of radioactive contamination within WESF, they are the capsules, WESF ventilation system, liquid radioactive waste system and the Facility structure. Capsules are designed to contain the highly radioactive Sr-90 and Cs-137 extracted from B-Plant waste and are constructed of Hastelloy and stainless steel. Four separate HVAC supply systems and three separate exhaust systems are provided for the 225-B Building. The K-3 system, which provides ventilation for the contaminated process cells, is the most contaminated. Large amounts of both cesium and strontium have been found in the K-3 exhaust duct. The exhaust stack from the K-l and K-3 exhaust systems is located south ofthe 225-B building. The stack is 107 cm (42 in) in diameter by 21 m (70 ft) high. Liquid radioactive waste confinement is provided by the Low-Level Waste System (TK-100). Facility structures that provide radiation confinement include the Hot Cells, Canyon, Hot Piping Trench, Pool Cell Area, Transmitter Rooms, and lead-glass shielding windows.
WESF safety support systems consist of the Fire Protection System and the Radiation Protection System. The Fire Protection system includes facility fire detectors with local and remote alarms and the fire sprinkler system. The radiation detection system consists of continuous air monitors (CAMS) and direct reading area radiation monitors (ARMS) with local and remote alarms.
3.0
IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF HAZARDS
The Emergency Management Guide on Hazards Assessment suggests the following screening thresholds to determine the need for a quantitative hazards assessment. These lists are not entirely inclusive. Other hazardous materials may exist in sufficient quantity which when released to the environment may pose public health hazards to Hanford workers and the general public.
The WESF radioactive material consists mainly of the cesium and strontium capsules, residual contamination in the hot cells and contamination in the ventilation system. The inventory in Table 3 .1 below is from HNF-SD-WM-BIO-002, Table 3-3, "Hazards Identification Results for WESF." The values were developed by facility personnel and represent a combination of maximum allowable inventories and estimated actual or maximum conditions. The inventories specified for the Truckport and the K-3 filters are the expected maximum inventories for these areas. The inventories specified for the K-3 exhaust duct, the hot cells, and the pool cells are conservative estimates of the radioactive materials present in those areas. These inventories are bounding because operations that might introduce additional contamination are no longer performed.
WESF inventory exceeds the screening values specified in IO CFR 30.72 Schedule C (1.1 1 E+14 bequerels (Bq) (3,000 Ci) of l37Cs and 3.33 E+12 Bq (90 Ci) of 9oSr). Therefore, an emergency planning hazards assessment and emergency planning is required for this facility.
There are no known chemicals of concern in the facility.
HAZARD CHARACTERIZATION
The screening process described above identified no chemical hazards exceeding the screening thresholds and an extensive radionuclide inventory that exceeds screening thresholds. The radionuclide inventory consists primarily of the capsules and large amounts of contamination in both facility systems and waste By far the most significant hazards arise from the radioactive isotopes 137Cs and 90Sr that are contained both in capsules in the pool cells (and possibly F and G Cells), and as contamination in the hot cells, K-3 exhaust duct, K-3 filters, and Truckport (as low-level waste). The radioactive materials represent both dispersal and direct radiation hazards. Since the capsules in F Cell would be suspect, the first confinement boundary is considered to be F Cell. The makeup of the contamination is unknown so two possible isotopic distributions are given.
Based on BIO assumption
The WIXM is a shielded ion exchange column used for removal of radioactive contaminants from pool cell water in the event of a capsule failure. The WIXM is stored outside the facility and only installed if needed.
Cesium
Inventory and Physical Properties
The inventory ofthe cesium137 is summarized in Table 3 .1. The majority of the material is contained in the capsules stored in the water storage pools. Capsules suspected of leaking are stored in F Cell. The remaining material is present as contamination in waste and facility systems.
The inventories specified for the K-3 exhaust duct, the hot cells, and the pool cells are conservative estimates of the radioactive materials that are estimated to be actually present in those areas. These inventories are bounding because operations which might introduce additional contamination are no longer performed. For the K-3 exhaust duct, the inventory data are based on records of dose rates taken in the exhaust duct. This contamination is present from former processing activities in the hot cells. For the hot cells the inventory data represent estimates of residual contamination on equipment and surfaces within the hot cell, based on historical operations within each cell. For the pool cells, the inventory data are based on the capsule storage configuration at the time of the generation of the inventory; however, the accident analysis uses maximum storage conditions. 
Strontium
Inventory and Physical Properties
Inventory of the strontium-90 involved in the postulated accidents is shown in 
WESF Exhaust Filters
Other than the capsules, the largest inventory of radioactive material at WESF is in the K-3 exhaust duct and filters. Exhaust air from the WESF Canyon and cells is filtered through two stages of HEPA filters connected in series and located in the K-3 Exhaust Filter Pit. In addition to this, air entering the hot cells from the canyon passes through a HEPA filter, and air exiting the hot cells into the K3 duct passes through an in-cell HEPA filter. The filtered exhaust is discharged via a centrifugal fan to the atmosphere via the stack. Filter inventory is shown in Table 3 .1.
TheK-3 Filterpit isapproximately4.9m(16.1 ft)wide by 11.3m(37.1 ft)longby3.4 m(11.2 ft) deep and is constructed from 0.3 m (1 fi) reinforced concrete. The top of the pit is at grade elevation.
The pit is partitioned into five sections by reinforced concrete dividers. Each section is equipped with cover blocks for remotely replacing the filters. The building houses two filter assemblies that are operated one at a time. The exhaust fans are located on a concrete pad at the south end of the pit and connected to the last filter section via a 0.6 m (2 A) diameter duct. There are two exhaust fans that are normally operated one at a time.
5.0
Calculation Models COMPUTER MODELS, RECEPTOR LOCATION, AND CLASSIFICATION CRITERZA
Radiological consequences are estimated using the Hanford Unified Dose Utility (HUDU) computer code. This code is the primary emergency response tool for evaluating radiological releases on the Hanford Site and in the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC).
HUDU employs a straight line Gaussian plume model and Pasquill-Gifford stability classes. Release source terms consider only the respirable fraction. Release of radionuclides into the environment are either elevated (effective release height is >2.5 times the building height) or ground level. By convention, release heights less than 10 meters default to ground level releases. In these analyses plume rise is not considered, producing conservative dose estimates.
Consequences from hazardous material events are estimated using the Emergency Prediction Information (EPI). The EPI program was developed by Homann Associates, Inc. for use in hazardous material emergency planning and response. The program has five source models; Continuous Release, Term Release, Area Continuous, Area Term, and Liquid Spill.
The liquid spill option calculates the source term from a pool of spilled liquid. The area continuous and area term options are also spills but the user must supply the source term. The EPI program uses both the plume and puff Gaussian dispersion models depending on the duration of the release. The program users manual documents the features of the program.
The consequences calculated in this document may not he identical to those identical accidents postulated in the facility's safety documentation. The primary reason for this is use of different computer codes.
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Meteorological Conditions
In order to determine the proper event classification for each scenario analyzed, consequences are calculated for a severe meteorological condition. For the purposes of this assessment severe meteorology is assumed to be F stability and 1 m/s wind speed. To be conservative, and unless otherwise noted, all releases were modeled as ground level open air (i.e., no building wake effects). To create information that will be useful for response personnel, calculations are also performed for a wind speed of 1 m/s and D and A stability classes. The following assumptions were made for the mixing layer depth for each of the stability classes used, A = 300111, D = 200m and F = 60m. The results provide information that can be rapidly scaled by responders in the initial stages of response to estimate consequences for the current meteorological conditions.
5.3
Receptor Locations
Two receptor locations are evaluated for purposes of comparing with the emergency classification criteria: a maximum onsite individual at a distance of 100 m (328 ft) (facility boundary) and a maximum offsite individual at the distance of 1 1 km (7.1 mi), the nearest Columbia River shore. Calculations were performed for Highway 240 as it is 8.3 km (5.2 mi) distant.
5.4
Emergency Classification Consequence Criteria A goal of the DOE emergency preparedness system is to quickly classify the severity of an accident. Preplanned actions are then implemented for each emergency class. The emergency classification is based, in part, on projected dose and concentration values at the facility and Hanford site boundaries for analyzed accident scenarios. The emergency classification criteria are shown in the following tables. There are also general criteria for emergency classification in addition to the numerical values in the tables above. The threshold between reportable occurrences and the Alert classification is difficult to establish based solely on a numerical value. The following general criteria apply in addition to the airborne release concentration values specified in the tables above.
ALERT
An ALERT Emergency shall be declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the facility with an increased potential for a release.
In general, the ALERT classification is appropriate when the severity andor complexity of an event may exceed the capabilities of the normal operating organization to adequately manage the event and its consequences.
SITE AREA
A SITE AREA Emergency shall be declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of facility functions needed for protection of workers and the public.
GENERAL
A GENERAL Emergency shall be declared when events are in progress or have occurred that involve actual or imminent catastrophic failure of facility safety systems with a potential for loss of confinement or containment integrity.
There is additional emergency classification guidance in the Emergency Management Guide on Event Classification and Emergency Action Levels. The Hazards Assessment in the following sections is based primarily on a comparison of calculated consequences with the numerical criteria in the tables above. However, some recommendations are provided based on the more general emergency classification criteria.
SCENARIOS AND CONSEQUENCES
Toxic Chemical Releases
No toxic chemicals exceeding the screening thresholds were identified at the WESF facility.
Radiological Release Events
The projected consequences from the events proposed in the following sections are used to establish the size of the emergency planning zone and to provide guidance for establishing Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
Natural Phenomena
Seismic events, high winds/tornadoes, and ashlsnow roof loading are natural phenomena with potential emergency consequences. Seismic events are analyzed below. During the design basis earthquake certain structures and facility systems survive the earthquake and continue to function normally. The immediate effects of the design basis earthquake on the hazardous materials in WESF result in the release from only two areas within the facility. The release is from the suspension of solid radioactive materials in the hot cells and the K-3 exhaust ducting.
During the beyond design basis earthquake it is assumed that all systems and structures that survived the design basis earthquake now fail in whatever configuration causes the greatest consequence. For the three conditions analyzed above, the approximate distances at which the EPA's PAG of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded are as follows: For the three conditions analyzed above, the approximate distances at which the EPA's PAG of 0.01 Sv ( 1 rem) is exceeded are as follows: 
A fire in B Cell propagates to C Cell (and vice-versa). Similarly a fire in D Cell propagates to E Cell (and vice-versa).
The plug ports and cover blocks are in place. HEPAs fail leaving an open flow path through the K-3 system. Mitigation from fire detection and suppression systems is not considered.
LPF is 1 .O corresponding to no HEPA filtration.
The initial temperature of the canyon is 40 "C (104 O F ) .
The maximum temperature of the hot cell reaches 400 ' C (752 O F ) . The inventory of B/C is 3EI 5 Bq (80 kCi) of 9% and 1.5E14 Bq (4 kCi) of 137Cs. A fire in B/C Cells bounds the consequences of a fire in D/E Cells. The ARF and RF values are 1E-2 and 1 .O, from Section 5.2.1.2 of DOE, 1994. All of the contamination is present on combustibles thus maximizing the calculated release.
No credit will be taken for plume rise as a result of the elevated temperature of the exhaust flow through the stack. Using the assumptions above the resulting release source term is 3.OE+13 Bq (800 Ci) 90Sr and 1.5E+12 (40 Ci) 137Cs. HUDU results are shown in the following table. Note:
consequences listed above are reduced by a factor of -20.
6.3.4
If credit is taken for the K-3 filters and the normally installed plug ports and cover blocks the
F and G Cell Fire
The WESF F and G Cells are used to store and handle cesium and strontium capsules. They do not contain appreciable radioactive contamination outside of capsules. The capsules are resistant to fires I (HNF 2000), however it is anticipated that suspect or known compromised capsules may be stored in F and G Cells, and the capacity of these capsules to resist the effects of fire is unknown. Administrative controls are in place to prevent the concurrent conditions of capsules in the hot cell, loose combustibles in the hot cell, and hot cell cover block or plug removed. Assumptions for this scenario include:
The cells do not contain significant quantities of combustibles. Pass-through doors between cells are normally closed.
Based on the administrative controls in place, lack of combustible material and the resistance of capsules to the effects of fire, any fire in either of these cells would have minimal consequences outside of the facility. These consequences are bounded by those analyzed for cells A through E above.
Truckport Fires
The Truckport, located at the west end of the WESF building, provides confinement for cask and low-level solid waste loading and unloading. The use of gasoline or propane in the Truckport has been identified as a possible cause for an explosion or fire. The consequence of an explosion is likely to be bounded by the fire analysis. Of the potential causes of a fire in the Truckport, the fuel fire is the most likely and has the greatest potential to spread to the solid waste. The following assumptions are used in this analysis:
The worse case conditions exist in the Truckport, roll-up door is open and the cover blocks from the Truckport to the canyon are removed. The fire suppression system in unavailable or fails. This section considers the range of upset conditions associated with the TK-100 and the K-3 ventilation systems. These conditions include high flow in the K-3 system, K-3 system water accumulation, K-3 filter drop, high activity in TK-100 and hot cell hydrogen accumulation.
High Flow in K-3 Ventilation System
Under normal operations, one of the two K-3 ventilation system fans is operating at all times. If the pressure differential in any of the ventilated zones is unsatisfactory due to failure of the online fan or overload of the system, the standby fan starts automatically.
High flow through the K-3 ventilation system could be caused by instrumentation failure, allowing multiple fans to run simultaneously, or could be a result of opening a flow path, such as the The results of this analysis indicate that under severe meteorological conditions this event should be declared a SITE AREA Emergency because the threshold of 0.01 Sv (I rem) is exceeded at the facility boundary but not at the site boundary. m: The results listed above would be reduced if the K-3 HEPA filters did not fail or the time to correct the condition were to be reduced. The consequences listed above would be reduced by 1 .OE-03 if the filters did not fail and the source term could be adjusted by 4.OE-5/h of the release.
K-3 System Water AccumulationlHydrogen Explosion
This scenario addresscs the potential for inadvertent accumulation of water in the K-3 ventilation system. Potential consequences are the build-up of hydrogen gas, increased radiation exposure rates in the vicinity of the K-3 Filter Pit (i.e., radioactive material could be washed into the filter housing) and blockage of the K-3 airflow resulting in a loss of ventilation in the facility. The worst case scenario would be the buildup of hydrogen in the hot cells with a resulting explosion.
Three potential mechanisms exist for accumulation of water in the K-3 ventilation system, a hot cell flood, TK-100 overflow and K-3 Filter Washdown System activation.
Water liiis hccn isoltired to 4 Cell throiigli E Cell t i n d (i Cell caiiiiiit tliiod iluc to tlic ctipsulc transfcr shoot. Since there is iio apprcciablc invwtor) iii F C'cll. tlic only inbeiitory added to the K -i filter siinip i i i rhc i'cciit o f a litit cell f l w d woiilcl he fronl tlic 1;-3 duct. Water could flood F Cell, exceed the level of the ventilation bypass or outlet duct, and travel until it reached the venddrain line leading to TK-100. If the drain line were plugged, TK-100 was overflowing, or the water flow rate was sufficiently high, the 2.5 cm (1 in) dam could be overwhelmed and the water could proceed to the active K-3 HEPA filter housing sump.
TK-100 is used to collect and stage batches of potentially contaminated low-level liquid waste. In addition to acting as the receiver tank for the K-3 exhaust duct drain line, it also receives water from numerous floor drains throughout the facility. If water diverted to TK-100 exceeded its storage capacity, I the tank could overflow through the 5-cm (2 in) vent line (K-3 duct drain line) and into the K-3 exhaust duct. If the TK-100 level monitors and/or alarms failed or if facility personnel could not identify and halt the flow, water could back up into the K-3 duct and begin to flood the active K-3 filter housing.
The K-3 filter washdown system is designed to allow washing (for decontamination purposes) of the in-line heaters, moisture separators, and other exposed surfaces upstream of the HEPA filters. The water from the washdown system is collected in the K-3 filter housing sump and is separated from the filter media by a steel wall across the interior of the filter housing.
The analysis performed in HNF-SD-WM-BIO-002 (HNF 2000a) indicates that there is insufficient hydrogen generation potential to be of concern from the TK-100 overflow or filter washdown system activation scenarios to be of concern. Therefore the analysis is based on the hot cell flood scenario.
I
The following assumptions were made:
The hot cell ventilation bypass seals would not prevent water in the hot cells from entering the K-3 duct. One filter housing, containing the maximum possible radioactive material inventory dissolved in the water and present on the filters, is involved in a hydrogen explosion as a result of a K-3 flooding event. One housing is assumed instead of both because this maximizes the calculated consequences while minimizing the time required to reach 4% hydrogen. Cell inventory and waste packaging restrictions are in place. Contamination in the exhaust duct consists entirely of 137'2s; 1.9E+14 Bq (5 kCi) and is washed into a K-3 filter housing. The contamination present on the K-3 filters is assumed to be 8.9E+12 Bq (240 Ci) of 137Cs and 6.7E+14Bq(18 kCi)of90Sr. All the energy from the material in the water flooding the filter housing is absorbed by the water. All hydrogen generated remains in the filter housing. The results of this analysis indicate that under severe meteorological conditions this event should be declared a SITE AREA Emergency since the threshold of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded at the facility boundary but not at the nearest site boundary.
TK-100 Hydrogen Explosion
The scenario addresses the possibility of 137Cs and 90% contamination accumulating in TK-100 and remaining for an extended period of time. The source of contamination could be water from the K-3 ductwork. Consequences are a buildup of hydrogen gas and a potential for increased radiation exposure rates in the vicinity of the TK-100 pit. Accumulation of contaminated liquid is possible in two ways: (1) liquid enters the K-3 exhaust duct and carries contamination into the 5-cm (2 in) diameter venvdrain line to TK-100, and (2) liquid enters the exhaust duct and carries the contaminated material into the K-3 HEPA filter housing where it is jetted from the sump into TK-100. In addition, liquid from any of 225-B Building area drained by the LLW system will drain to TK-100.
The following assumptions were made during the development of this scenario:
A gas explosion occurs.
Hydrogen is generated in TK-100.
The tank is assumed to he 75% full of liquid. This volume minimizes the time required to reach 4% hydrogen in the tank while allowing sufficient energy to cause failure of the tank. Hydrogen diffuses through the 5 cm (2 in) vent line according to the linear diffusion model. As a result of the explosion, the bottom of the tank ruptures resulting in a spray leak of the entire tank contents. Rev. 2 indicates that the time required for sufficient hydrogen to build up in the cells ranges from 9 to 180 days and that consequences are not expected outside the facility for this type of scenario. Therefore, these events would not he classified as an ALERT or higher.
Facility Explosions
This section discusses the potential for explosions within the facility. This includes consideration of welding gases, gasoline fumes, propane and hydrogen generation in the pool cell area.
Hydrogen Explosion in the Pool Cell Area
Radiolysis of water in the pool cells generates hydrogen during normal operation. With ventilation supplying and exhausting air in the Pool Cell Area, as sited in HNF-SD-WM-BIO-002, Rev. 0 I (HNF 2000) subsection 3.4.2.5, it has been shown that the maximum hydrogen concentration which occurs at the pool surface is substantially less than 1%. Therefore, it is assumed accumulation of hydrogen and subsequent combustion is not possible unless the K-1 and K-4 ventilation systems fail or are not operating. If the ventilation system fails, at least 226 hours (9 days) is required to build up a I flammable concentration of hydrogen (Section 3.4.5.1.1, HNF 3000).
Normal ventilation flow in the Pool Cell Area is approximately 140 rn3/min (5,000 c h ) . In the event of a ventilation failure, there is no natural draft or air leakage. No cover blocks are placed over active pool cells. An ignition source is present. Gas combustion will cause the walls and ceiling to collapse. The maximum inventory in the Pool Cell Area is 52.05 MCi of 137Cs. The gamma energy deposited in the water by the 137mBa (daughter product of 137'2s) is the only ionizing radiation not shielded by the capsules.
For a hydrogen explosion in the Pool Cell Area, two release mechanisms have been identified. The failed structural components could result in capsule failure or loss of pool cell water. The analysis of a sudden capsule failure, including consideration for failed building structural components, is addressed in subsection 6.4 "Loss of Containment". The analysis of a loss of all pool cell water without ventilation is contained in subsection 6.6.2, "Loss of Pool Cell Water".
Flammable Gas Explosions
This section addresses the possibility of a flammable gas explosion (other than hydrogen) in all areas of the facility. The flammable gases considered include acetylene, propane, and gasoline fumes; however the analysis was performed so as to be bounding for all flammable gas cylinders (subsection The possibility of a flammable gas explosion in the facility can be divided into two cases: highly volatile liquid fuels and flammable gas cylinders. The case of highly volatile liquids relates only to the Truckport area. During normal operations most trucks associated with the operations are dieselpowered. However, there is the possibility that gasoline powered vehicles could be used. In addition, a diesel-powered forklift is used in normal operations, but a propane-powered forklift is an optional backup. Flammable gas cylinders could be in use at almost any area of the facility. Such cylinders may be used for facility maintenance and modification activities. For highly volatile fuels used in the Truckport, the most severe condition would consist of a fuel leak or spill, generation of flammable gases, explosion and subsequent fire. The Truckport fire scenario has been analyzed in subsection 6.3.5, "Truckport Fire".
For the case involving flammable gas cylinders, the worst case condition would be gas leaking from the cylinder or the cylinder failing catastrophically. The gas would then be ignited resulting in an explosion. The bounding consequences would result from the pressure increase associated with the explosion. An explosion in any area of the facility has the potential to impact the Hot Cell and Pool Cell Area structures which contain the only radioactive materials vulnerable to this event.
The responses of the structural areas of the facility to an explosion are unknown. Impacts to the hot cells could result in cover block failure, loss of structural integrity, and subsequent suspension of radioactive material, as well as loss of shielding. Structural failure in the Pool Cell Area could result in a heavy object drop into an active pool cell and possible loss of cell water. The consequences from these two conditions are discussed in the following section.
Hydrogen Explosion in WIXM
This scenario postulates that a WIXM is installed in the truckport to remove contamination from pool cell water following a capsule failure. As the resin becomes loaded with radioactive material, the ionizing radiation results in radiolysis of the residwater and produces hydrogen and oxygen gases. If hydrogen were to accumulate inside the WIXM in quantities of 4 percent volume or more, the hydrogen can become flammable and eventually detonable if it continues to increase.
The following assumptions were made during the development of this scenario (Subsection A strontium capsule failure has occurred in a storage pool and the EMIX system put into service to cleanup the water. The WIXM is loaded to the maximum extent and then drained (allowing a void volume for the hydrogen to accumulate). The procedure requirement to fill the space above the resin bed with inert material during draining is not performed. An ignition source is present. For the three conditions analyzed above, the approximate distances at which the EPA's PAG of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded are as follows: The results of this analysis indicate that under severe meteorological conditions this event should be declared a SITE AREA Emergency since the threshold of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded at the facility boundary but not at the nearest site boundary.
6.6
Loss of Containment
This section considers a loss of containment accident as the result of an underwater capsule failure due to drop impacts and the loss of pool cell water.
Underwater Capsule Failure Due to Drop Impacts
A drop and resulting impact of a heavy object is a mechanism that could result in simultaneous damage to several capsules. This event has the potential to lead to a very rapid increase in the concentration of radioactive material in a pool cell. It also has the potential to simultaneously damage the pool cell liner and structure and cause a leak of contaminated water to the ground which could lead in turn to capsules being uncovered.
An object drop into a pool cell could lead to the following conditions:
A breach of the pool cell liner and structure. Mechanical damage to one or more capsules. Damage to the pool cell heat exchanger and recirculation piping. Flooding of the Pool Cell Area due to raw water leaking from a damaged heat exchanger.
The objects that pose a potential drop hazard include the pool cell crane, motorized catwalk, the 0 pool cell cover blocks, and the Pool Cell Area structural components. The possible means by which a drop impact could occur are as follows: falling structural members following an explosion, aircraft impact or beyond design basis earthquake and heavy object drop (e.g., cover block, bridge crane or catwalk failure).
A capsule failure resulting from an object drop would release radioactive salt into the pool cell water. In addition to the high energy-gamma-ray from the 137mBa daughter product, cesium chloride salt is far more soluble than strontium fluoride and is the overriding concern. The dose rates associated with such a release could be sufficient to prevent personnel entry into the Operating Gallery or Pool Cell Area. The failure of recovery actions could lead to the consequences discussed in subsection 6.6.2, 'Loss of Pool Cell Water'.
Pool cell concrete floor and sump will not act as a containment barrier for water leaking from a ruptured liner. The consequences and the number of capsule contents released are related in a linear fashion. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that one capsule is damaged. The leaking capsule is a cesium chloride capsule in Pool Cell 5 containing 1.97E+12 Bq (53.2 kCi). The cesium chloride is released so rapidly that no intervening actions are possible to halt the release. The cesium chloride immediately forms a uniform mixture within the pool water.
The entrainment rate fraction (Em) for cesium dissolved in a pool cell is 1.45E-lOA1, assuming a 
Loss of Pool Cell Water
This accident type is directed to those sequences that could lead to the total loss of water from one or more active pool cells. Initiators for this type of event are, heavy object drop, inadvertent pool drain, catastrophic failure of pool cell retention structure and failure to add makeup water with or without a loss of raw water. Two loss of water accidents are considered: (1) loss of water from a single pool, and (2) loss of water from all active pools.
Loss of Water from a Single Pool Cell
Potential initiators for the loss of water from a single pool cell include heavy object drop, drain line failure, and inadvertent water removal through operator error. A loss of water in one pool would lead to high radiation fields in the vicinity of the Pool Cell Area and, potentially, could result in an inability to maintain water level in the remaining active pool cells. Therefore, this event could be considered a potential precursor to the more severe loss of water from all pool cells.
The following assumptions were used in developing this scenario:
The capsule storage configuration consisted of 494 cesium capsules (Le., one 17 x 13 array and one 21 x 13 array) and 169 strontium capsules (Le., one 13 x 13 array). Heat generated in the pool was 110% of what the configuration would generate if all capsules had an average thermal power as of 01/01/96, This corresponds to 149 kW, which includes the energy of emitted gamma radiation. For the source term analysis, the pool cell inventory was assumed to be all cesium capsules to bound the potential release.
No strontium was released since the maximum centerline temperature of the strontium capsules does not exceed the melting point of strontium fluoride. Cesium chloride capsules failing due to corrosion release an average of 0.1 kg of salt, those failing due to stress (from salt expansion) release 2.9 kg of salt (Hey 2000) . Where 2.9 kg is the average net weight o f existing uncut cesium capsules. All capsule failures were treated as corrosion failures.
No structural failures are expected as a result of this event.
The release rate was assumed to be constant. HNF-SD-WM-BIO-002, Section, 3.4.3.3.1.2 (HNF 7000) indicates that a total of 51 capsules may fail due to corrosion or stress.
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It should be noted that the analysis of capsule transient temperature response indicates that 2 days would be required for the maximum centerline cesium salt temperature to exceed 700 "C (1,292 OF), I subsection, 3.433.1.2, HNF-SD-WM- BIO-002 (HNF 2000) . From data presented in Hey (7000) and WHC (1996) , no significant releases would be expected in this time frame. After 2 days, capsule failures could begin to occur due to stress and later by corrosion. For the consequences resulting from this scenario to occur, this situation would have to persist unmitigated for a prolonged period of time.
T \ w potential source terms associated with the draining of a single pool cell were examined. The first source term takes no credit for W A C or HEPA operation and small leakage areas are assumed such that the building does not pressurize. Therefore, a small release o f cesium salt occurs through leakage paths such as those present around doors seismic wall and ceiling joints (Wagenblast et al. 1999) . This results in a release rate of approximately 6.7E-10 kgih. The ~e c o n d condition places an upper bound on the tir\t source term by assuming all vaporized salt escapes into the environment. This results in a release rate of 5.4E-06 kg/h. For the purposes of this analysis the worst case release rate will be assumed and an exposure duration of 8 hours at each of the receptor locations. This results in a source term of 4.32E-05 kg of cesium salt released to the environment. The specific activity for the cesium salt is provided in HNF-SD-WM-B10-002, The total thermal output of all remaining uncut cesium and strontium capsules as of 01/01/96 is 403 kW (Hey 2000) . The worst case scenario was a moderate building leakage area equivalent to a 0.1 m2 (1 ft2) opening in both the roof and a side wall. The capsule storage configuration assumed 1,328 cesium and 600 strontium capsules. In comparison to cesium chloride, negligible strontium fluoride would be released. Cesium capsules failing due to corrosion or stress were assumed to release 2.9 kg of salt. This is the average net weight of existing uncut cesium capsules. The worst case scenario takes no credit for W A C flow, cooling or HEPA filtration. Small leakage areas are modeled such that the building does not become pressurized.
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The transfer ports between the pool cells and the transfer aisle is closed at all times except as part of a predefined operation or an emergency response action. The inhalation dose pathway could begin to exist 2 days after the loss of water event and has the potential to overshadow the direct shine dose to all potential receptors (for the offsite receptor it is the only significant dose pathway).
Four building conditions were examined to determine the worst case source term, subsection 3.4.3..3.2.2, HNF-SD-WM- BIO-002 (HNF 2000 For the purposes of this analysis the worst case release rate will be assumed and an exposure duration of 8 hours at each of the receptor locations. This results in a source term of 1.28 kg of cesium salt released to the environment. Since the specific activity for cesium salt is 1.47E+04 Cikg, the resulting source term is 1.88E+04 Ci of 137'2s. HtlDU results are shown below: 
4.2
For the three conditions analyzed above, the approximate distances at which the EPA's PAG of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded are as follows: The results of this analysis indicate that under severe meteorological conditions this event would be classified as a GENERAL Emergency because the threshold of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) is exceeded at the nearest site boundary.
The immediate hazard from this event is direct radiation exposure due to loss of shielding water.
I Analyses documented in Hey (2000) indicated that the dose rate due to the direct gamma-ray shine at a receptor 100 m (328 ft) from the nearest WESF outside wall would be 40 mSv/h (4 remh). Dose field I estimates (documented in Hey, 2000) at various locations in and around WESF, that could hamper recovery activities are provided in HNF-SD-WM-BIO-002, 
SUGGESTED EVENTS TO DEVELOP EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS AND EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS Toxie Chemical Emergencies
No toxic chemicals exceeding the screening thresholds were identified at WESF.
Radiological Emergencies Natural Phenomena
'Two seismic events were analyzed in subsection 6.2.1. Events also considered in this section include high winds/tornadoes and ash roof loading.
Seismic Events. Two earthquake scenarios were analyzed for WESF. The first is a design basis earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.25 g and the second is a beyond design basis earthquake with a ground acceleration greater then 0.25 g. It is unlikely that the exact magnitude of an earthquake will be immediately known, therefore based on the worst case analysis, any earthquake which results in damage to facility confinement structures should be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency.
High Winds/Tornadoes. Some damage is expected if high winds or a tornado strike the WESF Facility, such as damage to the external structure, upset of the ventilation system or damage to the exhaust stack. Release of hazardous materials from these type of events is expected to be minor and the consequences are bounded by the analyses of other scenarios.
The buildings have experienced two wind storms in recent years with gust to 3.6E+1 mkecond (80 mph) (1972) and 3.4E+1 m/second (75 mph) (1990) with no damage. To maintain consistency with EALs in use at other facilities it is suggested that an ALERT should be declared if sustained winds exceed 4.OE+1 m/s (90 mph) resulting damage to the facility is observed. And a SITE AREA Emergency should be declared if a tornado strikes the facility structures.
Ash Roof Loading. Table 2 .1 indicates the estimated ash depth deposited at the Hanford Site from past volcanic eruptions in the region. Although a heavy deposition could present health hazards to site workers due to respiration of ash, water supply contamination, and collapse of some of the older roofs, it is not expected that such an event would cause a significant release from the WESF Facility. There would probably be ample warning of an approaching large ash fall and the facility could be placed in a stable condition and steps taken to protect workers. Therefore, ash fall is expected to result in a significant loss of control of hazardous material that would require classification as an Operational Emergency.
Potential Event Indicators. Indicators for these types of events which could be used to produce facility specific Emergency Action Levels (EALs) include: causes damage to facility confinement Personnel observations Indications from local seismic stations Local or site meteorological system Radiation monitor readings from the facility stack, ARMS or CAMS confirmed structural damage to facility confinement. Which may be indicated by personnel observations, ventilation system differential pressure monitors, activation of exhaust and supply interlocks, and failure of ventilation system components.
External Events
The following events were not specifically analyzed in section 6.0, hut could result in consequences that require classification as an Operational Emergency. This accident type considers events which are man made but originate external to WESF, that could have an adverse effect on facility safety. Events discussed include loss of electrical power, aircraft accidents and accidents at nearby facilities such as B Plant.
Loss of Electrical Power. Considered for this event is a severe loss of normal electrical power to all essential motor control centers and failure of the backup diesel generator. Under these conditions the following facility support systems would not be available:
The following concerns are identified as the result of a loss of electrical power:
All ventilation supply and exhaust fans All pool cell water recirculation cooling due to loss of power to recirculation pumps All CAM alarms, beta monitors, weight factor instruments, etc.
Airborne contaminants in the hot cells, K-3 exhaust duct, and the K-3 filter housings may migrate to other areas within the facility and potentially to the environment. Inability to remove heat from pool cell water through the heat exchangers Potential for hydrogen buildup in the pool cell area and subsequent explosion leading to loss of cooling and makeup water.
Analyses in the WESF BIO (HNF 2000) concludes that the consequences of a loss of ventilation and subsequent loss of confinement would result in localized consequences within the facility, but would result in no significant consequences outside of the facility (see subsection 3.4.2.4). Therefore, this event should I be classified as an ALERT classification or higher.
The loss of power event has been identified as a potential initiator for a hydrogen explosion and rapid water loss or the loss of storage pool cooling capability. These events have been analyzed in subsections 6.2.5 and 6.2.7. Loss of all normal power would likely disable many of the installed facility monitoring systems.
Adiacent Facilities. The closest, and by far the most significant, facility is B Plant. Accidents at B Plant could initiate a subsequent accident at WESF. Or, an accident at B Plant could hamper recovery actions should WESF operating personnel be in the process of responding to a common cause event (e&, earthquake, loss of power, etc.).
The design basis and beyond design basis earthquakes for B Plant are less severe, 0.12g and 0.20g respectively, than they are for WESF. Unmitigated doses to the onsite receptor from the beyond design basis earthquake are several mSv (rem) (HNF 1999).
The B Plant Safety Analysis Report (HNF 1999) assumes a 221-8 Building roof collapse in the snow/ashfall event and a significant release and dose commitment to the onsite receptor. Several hours of warning would be expected for this type of event.
"F-4013, Rev. 2 Due to the proximity of B Plant to WESF, any event involving the actual or potential release of hazardous material at B Plant could have serious health and safety implications for WESF personnel, Therefore, it is suggested that the declaration of an Operational Emergency and initiation of protective actions at B Plant should be closely coordinated with the WESF Building Emergency Director.
Aircraft Crash. The range of possible releases from an aircraft crash is quite wide. A light aircraft crash near the facility may not release any material whereas a direct hit from a commercial jet liner could cause extensive damage to the facility and a large release.
The airspace over WESF is declared a no-flight zone for local, low-level flights. Analyses carried out for other site facilities indicate that an aircraft crash into WESF is an extremely unlikely event (Mulestein, 1994) . However, such a crash could result in impacts to the radioactive materials present in the facility. The consequences of such an impact could be similar to the beyond design basis earthquake analyzed in subsection 6.2.1, except the facility damage should be more localized and Hanford Site resources more readily available. An aircraft crash could impact the K-3 and K-1 filters, hut more severe consequences would be expected if the aircraft impacted the hot cells and/or pool cells in the 225-B Building. The consequences of accidents in these areas have been analyzed above. However, by far the worst case consequences would arise from failed building structural components causing the failure of one or more pool cells (see subsection 6.2.7, Loss of Pool Cell Water).
The consequences of a light private, commercial or military aircraft crash have been bounded by scenarios addressed above. Based on the consequences from the worst-case, it is recommended that any aircraft accident at WESF that results in structural damage breaching the building outer walls or an impact on or near the HEPA filter pits be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency.
Potential Event Indicators. Indicators for these types of events that could be used to produce facility specific Emergency Action Levels (EALs) include:
Personnel observations Notification from adjacent facility Radiation monitor readings from the facility stack, ARMS or CAMS -And confirmed structural damage to facility confinement. Which may be indicated by personnel observations, ventilation system differential pressure monitors, activation of exhaust and supply interlocks, and failure of ventilation system components.
Facility Fires
Fire scenarios were analyzed for the hot hells and the Truckport. Fires which are not rapidly I mitigated (e.g., within about 20 minutes) could result in significant release of radioactive material to the environment. The analysis results indicate that fires unmitigated for 20 minutes or longer in A Cell should be classified as an SITE AREA Emergency, in B and C Cells as a GENERAL Emergency, in D and E Cells as a SITE AREA and in the Truckport as a SITE AREA if hot cell waste drums or a loaded WIXM is present. The consequences of a fire in F and G Cells would E t exceed the threshold for an ALERT.
Personnel observations Building fire detection alarms (activated by smoke, heat or suppression flow) in hot cells or Hydrogen Accumulation/ExDlosion in Hot Cells. This event could be caused by cell flooding with resulting hydrogen explosion. Results indicate that that this event would not create consequences that exceeded the threshold for an ALERT Emergency.
I 7.2.5 Facility Explosions Subsection 6.5 discusses potential explosions within the facility. This includes hydrogen gas explosion in the pool cell area, flammable gas explosions and WIXM hydrogen explosion.
Hvdroeen Explosion in the Pool Cell Area. Two release mechanisms were analyzed for this scenario. Failed structural components could result in capsule failure or loss of pool cell water. Underwater capsule failure would not require classification due to the airborne release of hazardous materials. Classification of events involving the loss of pool cell water are discussed below.
Hvdroeen Explosion in WIXM. A hydrogen explosion in a contaminated WIXM could expel sufficient material to create a SITE AREA emergency.
Loss of Containment
Subsection 6.6.1 analyzes loss of containment events as a result of underwater capsule failure due to drop impacts and the loss of pool cell water.
Underwater Capsule Failure Due to Drop Impacts. A drop impact of a heavy object could result in I simultaneous damage to several capsules leading to C O i i t a i i i i i i a t i~) l i ofthc pool cell water. The analysis of this event indicates it would not require classification due to the airborne release of hazardous materials. The immediate hazard from this event results from the elevated dose rates in the pool cell area. For a single capsule damaged by an impact the resulting exposure rate could be as high as 470 R/h at 1 m above the center of the pool. However, neither dose rates or airborne releases would exceed the threshold for an ALERT.
Indicators for this event include:
Personnel observations Pool cell area ARMs/CAMs Pool cell in-line beta monitor system Loss of Pool Cell Water. Two scenarios were examined. The first was a loss of water from one cell and the other involved the loss of water from all cells.
The immediate hazard is direct radiation exposure due to loss of shielding water. Analyses indicated that the dose rate due to the direct gamma-ray shine at a receptor 100 m (328 ft) from the nearest WESF outside wall would be 20 mSv/h (2 rem/h). The loss of water in a single pool cell creates fatal dose fields within the Pool Cell Area and a field of approximately 120 R/h immediately outside the 225-B structure.
Currently there is no control that could be relied upon to terminate this event once capsules have been uncovered. Thus, facility control is effectively lost. Based on the loss of facility control and the immediate dose rate of 20 mSv/h (2 rem/h) at 100 m, this event should be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency.
Continued progression of the event leads to a gradual evaporative loss of water in the remaining pool cells and thermally induced failure of uncovered capsules. Even though relatively little in the way of airborne release would he expected from capsules initially failed in the single pools, the loss of facility control indicates that this event is a potential initiator to the more severe consequences of loss of water from all pool cells.
Personnel observations Pool cell level instrumentation Pool cell area ARMsKAMs (and other facility ARMS due to high dose rates) Pool cell leak detection sump Pool cell temperature alarms Based on the potential airborne release consequences, potential loss of facility control, immediate dose rates and difficulty of mitigation, the loss of all DOOI cell water should be classified as a GENERAL Emergency. As with the loss of water from one pool cell, the immediate hazards would he the dose rate due to the loss of shielding water. The analyses indicated that the dose rate due to gammaray shine at a receptor 100 m (328 ft) from the nearest WESF outside wall would be 40 mSv/h (4 rem/h). Indicators for this event would be similar for those listed above for loss ofwater from one pool cell.
I 7.2.7 Safeguards and Security
Malevolent acts involving explosive devices, sabotage, and hostage/armed intruder could result in degradation of facility safety or loss of control over hazardous materials that would warrant the declaration of an event classification. The WESF Vulnerability Assessment (B&W Protec, 1998) was examined to identify any additional conditions that should be addressed by the facility event classification system. Exdosive Device -An actual detonation of an explosive device in an area of the facility containing radioactive materials could result in their release to the environment. The consequences of this type of an event would be similar to or be bounded by the beyond design basis earthquake, aircraft crash or loss of pool cell water scenarios.
Based on the analysis in the WESF Vulnerability Assessment, it is suggested that the discovery, detonation or credible threatened detonation of an explosive device in the area of the K-3 filter pit he classified as a GENERAL Emergency.
Based on the scenarios analyzed in this assessment, it is suggested that the discovery, detonation or credible threatened detonation of an explosive device in any area (other than the K-3 filter pit) of the facility containing hazardous materials be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency.
Sabotage Scenario -Acts of sabotage could result in the release of hazardous material to the environment. For example, the deliberate misrouting of the capsule pool cell cooling water or misoperation of the facility ventilation system. Confirmed physical damage from sabotage, which causes an actual or potential release of hazardous materials to the environment, should be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency.
Hostage Situation/Armed Intruder. -A confirmed hostage situation, armed intruder, credible security threat, or ongoing security compromise involving physical attack on the WESF site that causes the actual or potential release of hazardous materials should be classified as a SITE AREA Emergency. Some examples of these types of events are as follows:
An armed assault directed at an individual employee, at gaining access to valuable property or classified material, or at causing damage to facility property. The motivation for and objectives of such an assault may not be known until long after the fact. Taking of hostages at the facility undertaken to extort money, materials, or concessions from the DOE, contractor or individual employee. The DOE contractor, or employee, may come under great pressure to meet the perpetrator's demands, some of which may have safety, health or environmental implications. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is an area within which special planning and preparedness efforts are warranted to mitigate the consequences of a severe accident. DOE Orders endorses the EPZ concept and requires that the choice of an EPZ for each facility be based on an objective analyses of the hazards associated with the facility. The DOE Emergency Management Guide recommends developing a composite EPZ for a group of facilities located in close proximity to one another. Using the results of facility hazards assessments and the method outlined in the EMG, a composite EPZ for the 200 East Area facilities has previously been established and documented in the Hanford Site Emergency Response Plan. The EPZ includes the area within a 10 mile radius of the geographic center of the 200 East Area. Ten miles, the maximum EPZ radius recommended by the EMG, was based on the combined weight of analysis results for postulated events associated with underground high level waste storage tank (Tank Farms) operations. The EPZ and its bases were reviewed against the results of this hazards assessment. It is concluded that the existing EPZ is still adequate and that no changes to the EPZ are warranted on the basis of this hazards assessment.
The following table contains the dose (TEDE) at the EPZ boundary, under severe meteorological conditions, for the scenarios analyzed in section 6.0 of this report. WESF is less then a mile from the geographic center of the 200 East Area, so a conservative distance of 9 miles to the nearest EPZ boundary was used. The only event that exceeds the one rem PAG at the EPZ boundary is the loss of water in all pool cells. This low probability catastrophic event would take days to develop allowing sufficient time to take protective actions.
9.0
WESF is responsible for ensuring that this Hazards Assessment is reviewed annually and maintained current. The review requirement is specified in DOE-RL-94-02, section 4.0.
MAINTENANCE AND REVIEW OF THIS HAZARDS ASSESSMENT
